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The notion of “philosophy of chemistry” challenges the singular in the phrase 
“philosophy of science”, which is the standard term for the discipline in the English 
language. This linguistic peculiarity has undoubtedly favored the tacit equation 
science = physics that has characterized mainstream philosophy of science during the 
course of the twentieth-century. The hegemony of physics has had profound 
consequences that have subsequently become identifiable. One of them is the increasing 
gap between philosophical reflection and science in action. As Joachim Schummer has 
pointed out: “Had those philosophers without prejudice gone into the laboratories, then 
they would have stumbled on chemistry almost everywhere”1. For there is a striking 
contrast between the philosophers’ neglect of chemistry and the quantitative data, which 
show that chemistry is by far the largest scientific discipline in terms of the number of 
publications indexed by the major journals of abstracts. Thus, philosophers have 
virtually ignored the major part of scientific activity choosing instead to focus on 
theoretical physics, which seemed more appropriate in light of the “linguistic turn”. 
The situation is slightly different in the European tradition. The plural “philosophie 
des sciences” which has prevailed in the French language may be due to 
Auguste Comte’s longstanding influence, since he strongly advocated a regional 
epistemology. The result is that chemistry has not been totally neglected. As I have 
argued elsewhere, chemistry helped shape the French tradition, especially in what can 
be labeled its “historical turn” and its focus on theories of matter2. Whether French 
philosophers interacted more with active scientists than their Anglo-Saxon counterparts 




or shared the scientists’ interests remains a matter of debate for historians of the 
philosophy of science.  
 After decades of neglect of chemistry in mainstream philosophy of science, 
however, the late twentieth century witnessed an impressive revival of philosophical 
interest in the discipline. Philosophy of chemistry has become a dynamic research field, 
establishing itself as a sub-discipline in the 1990s. An International Society for the 
Philosophy of Chemistry, founded in 1997, has organized an annual summer 
conference. Two journals have been launched, Hyle in 1995 and Foundations of 
Chemistry in 1999. Chemists and chemistry teachers have been the prime movers 
behind this renaissance of the philosophy of chemistry. For them, the hegemony of 
physics in the philosophy of science resonated with the reductionist ambitions of 
quantum physicists, who denied the very existence of any independent theoretical 
foundations of chemistry. For chemistry teachers, Paul Dirac’s famous 1929 claim that 
“the underlying physical laws necessary for the mathematical theory of a large part of 
physics and the whole of chemistry are thus completely known”, had always been a 
trauma, as it meant that their discipline could be taught as a sort of applied physics3. 
Their concern with the philosophical implications of Dirac’s statement was not shared 
by working chemists, who knew that the reductionist research agenda was impossible to 
achieve because the calculations would always be too complex. However, when digital 
computers allowed ab initio calculations, theoretical chemists started to worry once 
again about reductionism and became more interested in philosophy. Chemists felt the 
need to demonstrate that chemical concepts could not be deduced from quantum 
mechanical principles, giving rise to a flood of technical publications about 
reductionism in the 1980s.4. Chemists, advocates of the autonomy of their discipline, 
tend to use philosophy as a battlefield for their heroic struggle against the imperialism 
of quantum physics. As a consequence, reductionism and foundational issues have been 
the main concern over the last decade. Subtle conceptual distinctions became strategic 
to limit the dominion of quantum mechanics over chemistry: “quantitative reduction” 
does not mean “conceptual reduction”, “ontological dependence” does not imply 
“epistemic dependence”5. The notion of supervenience referring to asymmetric 
dependence has been envisaged as a possible substitute for the notion of reduction6. In 
this perspective, only a few aspects of chemistry – such as the interpretation of the 





periodic system – have drawn philosophical attention, while concepts and practices in 
daily use by laboratory chemists have been overlooked. Ironically the overwhelming 
concern with reductionism threatens to lead to a reduction of the emerging field of 
philosophy of chemistry to theoretical issues. If this trend continues, chemistry would 
paradoxically be bound in philosophical allegiance to physics, condemned to spend its 
existence ruminating over Dirac’s arrogant claim. 
 It is time for philosophers to face up to what is the most evident feature of 
chemistry, that it is not only a natural science but also a cornucopia of material 
technologies. Explaining and modeling are just two of its many facets. Chemistry is also 
about making, testing, measuring, improving yields… The dual face of chemistry 
demands a specific philosophical approach. It is not enough to revisit philosophical 
notions that have been sanctified in the context of a tradition of philosophy of science 
that has modeled its categories around theoretical physics. Indeed, to try to 
accommodate these notions to chemistry understood in its entirety is a hopeless task. 
 Chemistry needs a philosophy of its own. A number of French philosophers – 
Pierre Duhem, Émile Meyerson, Hélène Metzger – have paved the way for such an 
approach. In particular, Gaston Bachelard has suggested an alternative philosophy that 
he termed “metachemistry”7. Bachelard’s aim in The Philosophy of No, was to describe 
a new trend in science embracing non-Euclidian geometries, non-Aristotelian logics, 
non-Cartesian physics, non-Lavoisierain chemistry. The prefix “non” means i) that 
today’s science is not the continuation of the past and rather questions and challenges 
established knowledge through a polemical process; ii) the non-sciences are not 
however negations of past theories and rather include them as particular cases in a 
dialectical process. Since Bachelard’s aim was to promote a new updated “scientific 
spirit” rather than digging into the singularity of the philosophy of chemistry, here I will 
try to explore what Alfred Nordmann presented as “the promise of metachemistry”8. 
This aim cannot be achieved without a move away from the “linguistic turn” that has 
prevailed in the logical-positivist tradition, aligning instead with the “practical turn” that 
characterizes more recent philosophical trends.9 In this respect, I am merely following a 
path opened by Roald Hoffmann, Nobel laureate for chemistry in 1981, and adding a 
historical dimension to his philosophical essays10. I will first consider the impact of 




laboratory practices on chemical explanations and theories, before turning my attention 
to the issue of the ontological burden of chemistry. 
 
 
KNOWING THROUGH MAKING 
 
Any philosophical examination of chemistry should take into account the fact that 
chemistry is and always has been a laboratory science. The word “laboratory” itself, 
originally referred to the place where chemists worked and only gradually spread to 
include the spaces used for other kinds of experimental practice. Frederic Larry Holmes, 
a leading historian of eighteenth-century chemistry, insisted on the importance of this 
physical setting: 
 
The problems and objects of study of chemistry have been provided by and limited by the operations 
that could be performed on materials in a chemical laboratory […]. As theoretical structures 
changed and new objectives supplemented or displaced older ones, the stable setting of the chemical 
laboratory both identified chemists and distinguished them from other natural philosophers who 
dealt with some of the same phenomena that concerned them11.  
 
This physical niche determines both the object of chemical investigation and a 
specific way of knowing that is the chemists’. As the etymology of the term reminds us, 
the laboratory is a place of labour, of manual work rather than of inductive or deductive 
reasoning. The practice of chemistry is as much a physical activity as a mental exercise. 
Joan Baptista Van Helmont used to say that “God sells the arts in return for sweat”, 
meaning that knowledge of nature was to be obtained only at the cost of painstaking 
experiments12.  Chemists attempt to know substances by transforming them by means of 
manipulations and physical operations. Whatever the importance of chemical theory, 
chemistry is first and foremost concerned with making. Historically it was an art and 
craft before it became an academic science.13 Nowadays, if we look at scientometric 
studies, we can see that making new molecules remains a major part of the work found 
in academic publications14.  
 Historically, chemistry provided the grounds for criticizing the esprit de système, 
embodied by scholars “speechifying” in their doctoral robes. As an illustration, we can 
cite Diderot’s blistering offensive launched against speculative and abstract knowledge 
in De l’interprétation de la nature, an attack echoed in Gabriel François Venel’s heroic 





portrait of the chemist as an “artist”, in his article “chymie” in the Encyclopédie15. More 
recently, Roald Hoffmann has written: 
 
The reliable knowledge gained of the molecular world came from the hot and cool work of our 
hands and mind combined. Sensory data, yes, but we did not wait for Scanning Tunnelling 
Microscopes to show us molecules; we gleaned their presence, their stoichiometry, the connectivity 
of the atoms in them and eventually their metrics, shapes and dynamics by indirect experiments16. 
 
Indeed, “indirect” may be a key word for understanding the chemists’ way of 
knowing nature. They use the detour of the laboratory to access nature. This does not 
simply mean that they use the mediation of instruments to understand natural 
phenomena, like experimental physicists do. Rather, they take mediating practices much 
further by insisting that only man-made, artificial products provide information about 
natural substances. To know the nature and properties of substances, chemists proceed 
by analysis and synthesis. Since the Renaissance, decomposition or the resolution of 
bodies into their components, combined with recomposition or the recombination of the 
purported components to give the original substance, has provided the key to 
understanding material substances17. Joan Baptista Vico’s famous statement Verum et 
factum convertuntur, established that we can get rational knowledge only about what we 
have done18. For chemists, we can know only what we have produced through 
technological processes. As Bachelard noted, even when they extract plants or minerals 
from nature, chemists first submit them to a number of purifying processes19. Thus, they 
rely on facticity to understand nature. This is how Bachelard interpreted Marcelin 
Berthelot’s famous statement: “Chemistry creates its object”20. Making things and 
making them as pure as artefacts is the chemist’s approach to nature. 
 Bachelard also emphasized the asymmetry between analysis and synthesis. 
Indeed analysis can provide chemists with some evidence about the nature and 
proportion of the constituents of substances. However, it will never give them 
confidence, for there remains the suspicion that the results of analysis were produced by 
the analytical tools rather than being preexistent in the compound. Analysis lacks 
definitive demonstrative power. While it may serve the purposes of falsification, only 
synthesis has the power to confirm. There is no way to overcome objections apart from 
recomposing the original compound from its purported components. Synthesis thus 
stands as the realization of a conjecture about the composition or the structure of a 




substance. Chemical proofs depend on the reciprocity of analysis and synthesis, which 
are both indissociably intellectual and experimental processes. Their reciprocity is at the 
root of Immanuel Kant’s admiration for Georg Ernst Stahl, who “transformed metals 
into calx and calx into metals”21. 
 
 
“MAKING UP STORIES WHILE MAKING MOLECULES”22 
 
Making is the chemists’ major activity, and it is more than simply a material 
practice. It also characterizes an intellectual practice. As Hoffmann put it, they are 
“making up stories” about what they are doing with their hands and flasks. Chemical 
theories, unlike theories in physics, are not really aimed at explaining phenomena. 
Rather, they try to make sense of phenomenological data using stories about tiny 
invisible atoms or molecules. As early as the seventeenth century, Nicolas Lemery 
forged hooked and spiny atoms to account for the behaviour of acids and alkalis, while 
modern chemists use molecular models to predict new compounds. In so doing, they do 
not claim to provide a causal explanation, and their theory is closer to being a narrative. 
Just as early-modern hooked and spiny atoms were a “Cartesian novel”, modern 
electronic orbitals could be regarded as a “quantum novel”. Similarly, the structural 
formulas invented by nineteenth-century chemists were not meant as representations of 
the real world of atoms and molecules. Thus, Charles Gerhardt, who was a staunch 
advocate of atomic notation, drew the formulas of organic compounds according to 
three molecular “types”. He used these types to interpret a great many reactions, and 
even predicted unknown compounds by substituting radicals for hydrogen in each of the 
types. But he never suggested that his formulas reflected the internal architecture of the 
compounds he was representing and refused to view the radicals as isolable and real 
bodies. They were useful and indispensable fictions.  
 Nevertheless, speaking of “fictions” does not necessarily mean that chemical 
theories have no truth-value at all or that they should be viewed as mere instruments for 
prediction and classification23. Instead we need to redefine what counts as the truth-
value of chemical statements. The dilemma of instrumentalism (or positivism) versus 
realism is a pitfall that chemists need strenuously to avoid. If by realism we mean the 





representation of an external reality, it is just as inadequate a label as instrumentalism. 
Chemists make extensive use of visual images but these are not intended to refer to real 
individual molecules. Rather they are better thought of as icons representing relations 
between individual entities. Chemists seem to share the conviction that the bedrock of 
chemical properties does not lie at the ultimate level of matter. In other words, they do 
not strive to reach the roots, or to unveil the ultimate building blocks of matter. They 
make up plausible narratives to account for the properties observed in individual 
substances that they use, or to predict and make new substances with desired properties. 
In so doing, they are constantly shifting from the macro- to the micro-level24. Thus, they 
never settle on a scale for their reflection, with the constant shifting between levels 
determining their characteristic expository style. Chemistry textbooks, whether from the 
seventeenth century or most recent ones, tend to juxtapose narratives of experiments 
performed at the macro-level with narratives about relationships between microscopic 
invisible entities. The two kinds of narrative run in parallel but neither alone accounts 
for the ultimate causation.  
 Rather than being ideal accurate representations of nature, these narratives 
display meanings, with atoms and molecules best described as actors in a story. Even 
when these invisible entities are visualized using imaging techniques, they do not mirror 
the ultimate reality underlying phenomenological appearances, although they do mean 
something for the chemists. In certain cases they may mean that there is a possibility of 
breaking a bond, or of substituting a functional group or of encapsulating certain atoms 
within a cage molecule, etc. In addition stories require a temporal structure: temporality 
plays a prominent role in chemical narratives as the kinetics determines whether the 
reaction will be a success story or not. Wilhelm Ostwald was, like Berthollet, concerned 
with incomplete reactions whose outcome depends on subtle equilibriums, and 
proposed new narratives of chemical experiments based on the frequency of collisions. 
Thus, for example, catalytic materials that prompt the advancement of a reaction in a 
specific direction play a similar role to that of the hero’s companion in epic narratives. 
 
 
REQUIREMENTS AND OBLIGATIONS 
 




Hoffmann’s metaphor of story telling suggests that chemical theories have very 
weak explanatory power. In fact, Hoffmann makes the case for the “power of poor 
theories” and insists that two alternative theories, belonging to different paradigms, are 
not necessarily incommensurable25. A standard example is Linus Pauling’s theory of the 
chemical bond, associating Lewis’s notion of a shared electron pair with the quantum 
mechanical notion of a covalent wave function, which proved to be extremely useful in 
heuristic terms. Hoffman comments:  
 
I think incommensurability is no problem whatsoever to chemists. Differences in language are there, 
the result of different paradigms, but more so of history, and of education. Yet people, eager to make 
things, with no handwringing on how problematic it all is, graft one way of understanding onto 
another. 
  
Making up stories does not, however, mean that chemists rely on fanciful and 
arbitrary accounts. It just means that chemists do not claim to reach the roots, or the 
ultimate cause of phenomenological data. Chemistry, like other experimental sciences, 
is a normative activity. But if its ruling norm is not to provide the perfect representation 
of reality, we may nevertheless demand what kind of norms are in use in this science. 
 The distinction between requirements and obligations forged by Isabelle 
Stengers in her “ecological” approach to practices in science is particularly helpful for 
characterizing chemical practices26. Experimental scientists like to see their activities as 
conforming to a number of criteria or standards, including logical rules, experimental 
controls, peer review, etc. Conforming to such general widely accepted rules allows 
them to draw a clear demarcation line between their practices and others that are 
generally considered to be non-scientific or at least less scientific. Fulfilling such 
criteria is thus indispensable for defining the identity of a scientific practice, and in this 
respect chemists are no exception. They comply with the canons of the so-called 
scientific method, which shows that they are full members of the scientific tribe. 
However, Stengers argues, experimental practices are also governed by a number of 
more elusive and tacit norms – dubbed “obligations” – instituted by active scientists in 
specific contexts. The chemists’ obligations are the collective standards that they have 
adopted over the centuries in order to learn something about nature from their 





experimental practices, while at the same time never forgetting about making, and 
producing new artefacts or drugs.  
 Galileo’s major obligation – that only matters-of-fact can tell us about the truth – 
led him to question nature in a mathematical language in his experiments on falling 
bodies. By contrast, the chemists’ major obligations seem to be caution and skepticism. 
Crystals, liquids or gases in flasks behave in unpredictable and sometimes positively 
dangerous ways. These behaviors are so puzzling that chemists had to forge an arsenal 
of obligations: purifying, synthesizing, submitting them to standard reactants to settle 
their identity and characterize their properties. For this purpose of identification they 
rely on a wide range of different tests. In medieval times, chemists tested everything 
with fire, but since then they have come to use all sorts of chemical reactants and 
physical techniques of measurement, ranging from traditional balances, hydrometers, 
gasometers, to modern spectrometers. They have to pay particular attention to the 
conditions of their experiments – in some cases even more than experimental physicists 
– as slight modifications in temperature, pressure, concentration etc., can alter the 
course of a reaction, thereby changing the composition of the product. Since Robert 
Boyle’s famous publication, ‘sceptical’ has often been associated with the word 
‘chemist’. It does not mean that chemists are stubborn unbelievers. Rather it is because 
what they know about chemical substances and chemical reactions justify a cautious 
attitude concerning any conclusions they might be tempted to draw from their 
experiments. 
 Identifying, naming, and classifying are the chemists’ principal responses to 
their major obligation. Due to their “creativity” – millions of new molecules are 
reported in the Chemical Abstracts each year – chemists are continuously under 
pressure, as they have to find a name and a place for all these newcomers in their 
databases. In 1787, when a group of French academicians designed a “method for 
naming”, they assumed that by formulating the major requirements for a chemical 
nomenclature, they would provide subsequent generations with reliable guidelines for 
naming any newly discovered substances27. They formulated general rules for coining 
systematic names based on composition, and banished names based on the substance’s 
qualities, its uses, or the circumstances of its discovery. In doing so, they were acting as 
‘architects of matter’, designing and planning future chemical edifices. The growing 




number of organic compounds in the nineteenth century nevertheless generated a 
chaotic situation with dozens of different names for the same substance. Standardization 
and systematization were the two leading requirements reiterated at the end of the 
nineteenth century by the first International Conference on chemical nomenclature held 
in Geneva in 1892. The concerted response was to give each substance an official name, 
but most of them were never used by chemists in their daily chemical practices. Indeed, 
this ideal of standard and systematic names has been continuously challenged, and 
linguistic customs established within scientific journals tended to prevail, meaning that 
the standard names in common use no longer complied with the original ideal of a 
systematic nomenclature. Regular international meetings and a permanent commission 
on nomenclature at the International Union for Pure and Applied Chemistry continue 
periodically to revise the rules. Still, the current nomenclature is by no means as 
systematic as the 1787 reformers had envisioned. Trivial names – names that do not 
refer to the structure of the compound – coexist with the systematic names that conform 
to the rules. In fact, both in organic and inorganic chemistry, most names are semi-
trivial, mixing informal parts with those constructed following the systematic rules. 
Thus, the difficulty of keeping up with systematic names for extremely complex 
compounds proved so difficult that chemists had to renounce their ambition of 
submitting the molecular world to their ideal of rational systematization. This obligation 
may be considered a fundamental weakness, a sign of the imperfection of the chemical 
sciences. But what Stengers means by “obligation” suggests a more charitable reading. 
This term suggests a kind of binding agreement between chemists and the object of their 
investigations. Chemists are “obliged”, in the dual sense of the word, bound by and 
indebted to the growing population of molecules they both create and investigate. They 
are less “architects of matter” than dusty laborers trying to discipline a jungle of diverse 
molecules. 
 The repeated attempts to classify chemical elements during the nineteenth 
century provide another illustration of the interplay between requirements and 
obligations. The official requirement was to group simple substances according to their 
common properties. Nevertheless, chemists soon realized that the ideal of a “natural 
classification” reflecting all the similarities between the elements would be impossible 
to achieve. They consequently adopted “artificial classifications”, based on one or two 





properties arbitrarily selected among the wide variety of candidates. They even 
combined artificial classifications for metals with natural classifications for non-metals 
while admitting that the division between metals and non-metals was itself artificial. 
Such hybrid arrangements are far from the rational ideal and might therefore be 
considered a major defect. Chemists were, however, “obliged” to adopt and teach such 
imperfect solutions, as they were aware that their picture of the material world was 
inevitably biased, that between the exigencies of an operational system and an ideal one 
something had to give. Emile Meyerson, a chemist turned philosopher, argued that 
although the distinction between metals and non-metals was arbitrary, chemists used it 
because they had to draw strong distinctions, to artificially introduce rigid demarcations 
into the flux of complex inter-relations, in order to be able to refute conjectures. 
Rigidity and falsification add truth-value to the story invented by chemists. Meyerson 
used a suggestive metaphor, borrowed from Arthur Balfour, to characterize the 
chemist’s approach to nature: they are “drawing a fiber” out of the magma of reality. 
Chemical classifications seem to be based on the assumption that nature is composed of 
a “fibrous structure” in which they select a specific region in order to disentangle the 
local network of relations.28 Focusing on a fiber, they start reasoning about its 
connections with the whole fabric, while all the time looking at the landscape created by 
the extraction of this one fiber. They never claim that this fiber is the root of the 
structure, or the unique entry into the puzzle. But drawing out a fiber is their obligation, 
which means, on the one hand, that they must not break it, and that they must use it as a 
robust guideline. On the other hand, they are not to treat the fiber as a completely secure 
element that would permit safe deductions. “If…then” is a forbidden leap in a jungle 
where unexpected surprises are strewn on every pathway. Thus, chemical classification 
remains an open field. More than a century after Mendeleev’s periodic system came to 
be considered “the chart of nature” a view subsequently justified by atomic physics, 
chemists are still unsure about the best way to represent the periodic function. There is 
no ideal chart. Each year, new systems are designed and new graphic representations are 
submitted for publication, some of them concocted by obscure chemical practitioners, 
suggesting that classifying elements remains a work in progress, a communal and 
endless task29. 
   





“NO NATURAL BODY CONSISTS OF MATTER PER SE” 
 
An aura of materialism surrounds the image of chemistry, which derives as much 
from the chemist’s concern with material things as from the abundance of material 
goods generated by the chemical industry. 
 Ironically, however, chemists do not care very much for matter. They have used 
the terms “substances” or “bodies” for centuries but, as Venel noted in Diderot’s 
Encyclopédie, “no natural body consists of matter per se”. 30 Rather than being 
concerned with matter in general, chemists want to know why only one particular acid 
dissolves gold or why spirit of niter joined to salt of tartar produces true saltpeter. They 
pay attention to individual properties, with reference to a jungle of different materials 
and their potentialities. 
 Chemistry is concerned with the stuff things are made of, but we need to ask 
what concept of substance they use. In The Philosophy of No, Bachelard argued that the 
metaphysical notion of substance inherited from the Ancient Greek quest for 
permanence has been modeled on classical physics. Since Descartes, matter has been 
regarded as an essentially homogeneous substance defined in geometrical terms, with 
the diverse sensory properties that characterize the multiplicity of the phenomenal world 
being merely “secondary qualities” arising from the spatial arrangements and 
rearrangements of indistinguishable elements. This metaphysical notion of substance as 
a permanent and pervasive substrate underlying phenomenological change is, however, 
completely inappropriate for chemistry. What might a “metachemical” notion of 
substance look like? The stuff that chemists call ‘substances’ is always in the plural. 31 
For chemists, substances are concrete entities with individual properties. Explanations 
of chemical phenomena rely on a few immutable elements responsible for the individual 
properties of compounds. They may be irremediably invisible but they can be traced by 
means of the sensible effects that they cause at the phenomenological level, or by means 
of their circulation from one combination to another. 
 The dichotomy concerning this issue outlined above suggests that as far as the 
philosophy of matter is concerned, physics and chemistry are heirs to two different 
ancient traditions, with physics deriving from Democritus and Epicurus and chemistry 





from Empedocles and Aristotle. In the former case, the endless variety of substances 
with their individual specific properties is referred to essentially similar atoms, only 
distinguishable with respect to their figures and movements, while in the latter case, the 
variety of individual properties is attributed to strongly individualized principles. In 
Le Mixte et la combinaison chimique, Pierre Duhem suggested a similar distinction 
between two “research schools”. The first was the “corpuscular school” – Cartesian and 
then Newtonian – which one could characterize by Boyle’s assumption of a “catholic 
matter”, and which would lead to the mechanistic models of the nineteenth century that 
Duhem rejected. The second was the “Aristotelian school”, taken to be characterized by 
its rejection of all “systems”, all a priori reasoning, as well as its firm attachment to 
irreducible qualities.32. 
 This dual genealogy is, however, superficial and in the end misleading. The so-
called rival paradigms – the monist, atomistic, mechanistic philosophy versus the 
pluralist, qualitative doctrine of elementary principles – were not incommensurable. 
Most chemical theories managed to combine them in some fashion. As historians of 
early modern chemistry have shown, a corpuscular theory was embedded in the 
alchemical tradition, and was, in fact, crucial for justifying the possibility of 
transmutation.33 It is now well established that Boyle’s corpuscular philosophy, for 
example, stemmed from this longstanding alchemical tradition transmitted via Daniel 
Sennert. Thus, Boyle’s corpuscular philosophy was not the grafting of a physical theory 
onto a previously incoherent body of alchemy or iatrochemistry34. Later on, 
Georg-Ernst Stahl also assumed that material bodies were constituted by the mixta, 
composita and supercomposita of constituent particles. He assumed a corpuscular view 
of matter meshed with a view of individual principles acting as the vehicles of the 
properties. Such combinations suggest that atomist views and the principle theories 
were deployed for different purposes and did not address the same issues. Neither of 
them holds the secret of matter. For chemists, there is no privileged ultimate level of 
reality; instead they adopt what Bachelard termed a “laminated reality” since laboratory 
practice gives access to substances at multiple levels simultaneously35.  
 
 
THE CHEMISTS’ “ESSENTIAL TENSION” 





Stahl used a clear-cut distinction to differentiate the territory of chemistry from that 
of physics. He acknowledged that mechanical physics could account for one species of 
material compounds, namely “aggregates”, whereas only chemistry could deal with 
“mixts”36. Aggregation was a juxtaposition of units, and could be understood in 
mechanical terms such as mass and movement. Mixtion, however, was the union of 
principles involving individual affinities. The decomposition of an aggregate would not 
affect the properties of its components whereas the dissociation of a mixt entailed 
changing the properties of its elements.  
 This conceptual distinction echoed the issue raised by Aristotle in 
De generatione and corruptione I about the mode of presence of the constituents in a 
mixt. The problem emerged from a critical review of atomism. If atomist doctrines were 
right, then a mixt would be just a collection of atoms placed side by side, like grains of 
wheat and grains of barley. “To the eye of the Lynx nothing would be combined”37; 
Constituents would be physically present in the compound although not visible at first 
glance. Thus, they can be recovered without changing the properties of the compound. 
Aristotle insisted that if the components are preserved unchanged then the mixt is only 
apparent. By contrast, a true process of mixture involves the interaction of qualitatively 
differentiated ingredients in such a manner that they do not persist unchanged in the 
resulting compound. A true mixt is not, therefore, composed of constituents sticking 
together. Something new is created, with properties not possessed by the original 
ingredients. The emergence of a new ‘stuff’ implies that the ingredients no longer 
coexist with the mixt. Consequently, a true mixt can be characterized by an either…or 
condition. Either you get a compound and you lose the properties of the initial 
ingredients, or you recover the original ingredients and you lose the properties of the 
mixt. By contrast, the atomic conception of chemical combination does not demand 
such a disjunction. 
 Paul Needham, who offered a detailed analysis of Aristotle’s conception of 
mixts, has convincingly argued that Aristotle raised the fundamental issue of chemistry, 
i.e. the generation of new substances out of initial ingredients38. This clear recognition 
of the problem should not, however, be used to suggest that Aristotle conceived a 





“theory of chemical reaction and chemical substances”, as Paul Neeham seems to argue, 
since chemistry did not exist as an identifiable branch of knowledge at this time. 
 Avoiding such anachronisms is important for grasping the concept that I have 
dubbed the chemists’ “essential tension”. By referring to the title of Thomas Kuhn’s 
famous book, I want to draw attention to the specificity of chemistry. Indeed the tension 
that Kuhn found implicit in scientific research between tradition and revolution, 
between conformism and iconoclasm is also at work in chemistry, although its identity 
has been shaped by a more specific tension between two competing views of chemical 
combination39. At the turn of the eighteenth century, Stahl’s distinction between 
aggregates and mixts was aimed at circumscribing a territory for chemistry, centered on 
the notion of the mixt, in a defense against attempts at annexation by mechanism. So 
successful was this conceptual strategy, that Stahl was proclaimed the founder of 
chemistry throughout the eighteenth century. A century later, however, chemists no 
longer used the word mixt, as the notion of composition prevailed. In particular, 
Lavoisier’s famous definition of elements as undecomposable substances was an 
integral part of a reorganization of chemistry along the lines of another distinction, that 
between simple and compound. Lavoisier, who came to earn the title of the founder of 
“modern chemistry”, redefined it as the science that aimed at decomposing natural 
bodies and “examining separately the various substances entering into their 
combination”40. To be sure the compositional perspective was nothing new, but with the 
reform of chemical language it became the dominant paradigm41. In the new language, 
names of compounds were coined by simple juxtaposition of the names of their 
components, and were considered as “mirror images” of the actual composition of the 
material bodies in question42. Lavoisier, who admired and extensively quoted 
Etienne Bonnot de Condillac’s Logic, adopted his views of languages as analytical 
methods as well as his notion of analysis as a two-way process, from simple to 
compound and from compound to simple. According to Condillac, analysis is a mental 
process involving the successive visualization of the individual elements of a picture 
presented simultaneously as a whole to the senses. Condillac used the metaphor of 
sight-seing from the window of a castle. Immediately I see a landscape, then by analysis 
the mind will distinguish and name each element of the landscape pre-existing in the 
global view.43.  Condillac’s logic, inspired by algebra, in turn inspired Lavoisier’s use 




of equations to describe chemical reactions. A compound is described as the addition of 
two constituent elements. It is entirely characterized by the nature and proportion of its 
constituents. The use of the sign “equals” in the equation clearly indicates that chemists 
are no longer thinking in terms of the either/or condition. The puzzling issue raised by 
Aristotle about the mode of the presence of ingredients in the compound has been laid 
aside, discarded rather than being solved. 
 Reinforced by John Dalton’s atomic hypothesis, the compositional paradigm has 
proved very successful. By the middle of the nineteenth century, the definition of a 
compound according to the nature and proportion of its constituents was being 
challenged by a structural paradigm that emphasized the importance of the arrangement 
of the atoms in molecules. Nevertheless, empirical and structural formulas both 
eliminate the either/or condition. The actual presence of the constituent elements 
suffices to account for the properties of the compound. 
 Pierre Duhem’s return to Aristotle’s notion in the title of Le mixte et la 
combinaison chimique (1902) was clearly intended to undermine the prevailing atomist 
interpretations. The familiar example of sugared water in his introductory chapter 
summarized Aristotle’s theory in a few words, and restored the legitimacy of the 
either/or condition: 
 
What in general, then, is a mixt? Some bodies, the ones different from the others, are brought into 
contact. Gradually they disappear, they cease to exist, and in their place a new body is formed, 
distinguished by its properties from each of the elements that produced it by their disappearance. In 
this mixt, the elements no longer have any actual existence. They exist there only potentially, 
because upon destruction the mixt can regenerate them44. 
 
Duhem mainly reproached atomistic explanations for assuming that the properties 
of a compound could be deduced from those of its constituent elements or atoms. His 
criticism also encompassed Lavoisier’s compositional paradigm, since elements are not 
conserved as such in chemical reactions. 
Emile Meyerson indirectly addressed the same issue although, unlike Duhem, he 
claimed that chemists could not do without atoms. He nevertheless pointed to the 
either/or issue involved in chemical equations, starting with the observation that when 
chemists write the equation Na + Cl = Na Cl, they obviously presuppose the 
conservation of matter45. He observed that, interpreted literally, a chemical equation is a 
non-sense. In asserting that the addition of a soft metal like sodium to a greenish gas 





like chlorine equates to a colorless salt, chemists seem to be oblivious of the very 
conditions of their laboratory practice. Although they continuously play on the 
potentialities of various individual substances and take advantage of their differences, 
they admit that the compound “equals” the sum of its initial ingredients.  
 Thus chemistry seems to be moved by two antagonist forces. On the one hand, 
chemists aim at reducing the qualitative diversity of substances to identity. They would 
like to deduce their empirical data from an ultimate hidden cause in order to “satisfy 
their rational tendency to identification”, to use Meyerson’s terminology. Chemical 
equations balancing the inputs and outputs of chemical reactions are the best expression 
of this effort aimed at identification. They presuppose subsistence throughout chemical 
change, or the conservation of elements in chemical reactions, even though the diversity 
of substances and their idiosyncratic behaviours constitute the very raison d’être of 
chemical practices. Without a diversity of substances with their own individual 
properties and without a diversity of processes of reaction, there would be no chemical 
reactions and so no chemistry. Thus, chemists have no choice but to face 
“irrationals” (again using Meyerson’s terminology). They sense that it is useless to try 
and reach the ultimate reality, and hopeless to try reducing everything to sameness46. 
 The tension between the two conflicting views of chemical combinations is not 
necessarily to be understood as a fight between the rational and the irrational, or as a 
contrast between a rational tendency and a more pragmatic one. After all, atomic 
theories do not hold a monopoly over rationality47. Moreover, atomic notions, and 
molecular models are man-made “artifacts”, tools forged for theoretical and practical 
purposes. Nevertheless, the tension is an essential one, as neither of the perspectives is 
sufficient to account for chemical combinations, while the two descriptions do not work 
harmoniously together. Chemical combinations thus offer a new case of 
complementarity in Niels Bohr’s sense; two necessary but nevertheless exclusive 
descriptions of a phenomenon48.  
 
 
MATTERS OF CONCERN 
 




Because chemists are not really concerned with understanding the fine structure of 
matter, they have regularly dismissed all hypotheses concerning the real existence of 
atoms. For instance, August von Kekulé, who conjectured the hexagonal structure of 
benzene that formed the basis of most artificial organic compounds manufactured in the 
second half of the nineteenth century, denied the existence of atoms. More precisely, he 
banished the ontological issue from chemistry, claiming that it belonged to metaphysics. 
Thus, chemists made extensive use of atoms and molecular models while denying their 
existence or claiming that they were simply fictions. This apparently inconsistent 
attitude survived (in France at least) long after the first demonstrations of molecular 
reality and the founding of atomic physics. For instance, the French chemist Georges 
Urbain wrote in 1921: “It is not absurd to suppose that the atomic model is identical 
with absolute reality. However, we know nothing positively about it. This model is a 
work of art”.49 Such claims have sometimes been viewed as evidence for the theory 
that, under the pernicious influence of Auguste Comte, French chemists were sticking to 
strictly positivist positions, and consequently lagging behind modern chemistry. 50 This 
apparently inconsistent attitude was not, however, confined to the small circle of French 
chemists. The ontological status of bonds and orbitals was discussed at length by the 
founders of quantum chemistry, with some of them denying their physical reality in an 
effort to demarcate the chemical approach to concepts such as resonance borrowed from 
physicists.51 Chemistry thus appears as a science bound to ontological non-commitment, 
an attitude not shared by modern physicists.  
 If we resist the temptation of identifying the philosophy of physics as the “right 
model” for all of the sciences, how are we to understand the strange attitude of these 
non-committal chemists? For Meyerson, the chemists who denied the existence of 
atoms simply lacked authenticity52. He assumed that all chemists professed a naive 
realism, a belief in the existence of things such as barium sulphide, for instance. 
Meyerson is right: chemistry is certainly not ontology-free, although he misunderstood 
its ontology. The assumptions underlying chemical practices do not concern things such 
as barium sulphide, or rather, to be more precise, this sort of  “thingism” (chosisme) is 
not typical of chemists. Two major matters of concern more adequately characterize 
their ontology: i) a concern for relations, and ii) a concern for agency. 
 







There is no question that chemists deal with individual substances and pay attention 
to their molecular structures, but these things are of interest to them only in so far as 
they enter into relation with other units. Nineteenth-century structural formulas were not 
meant to be images of reality, and yet nor were they pure conventions. Rather they 
depicted capacities for bonding, the so-called atomicity or valence. Similarly, series of 
compounds were essentially viewed as potential combinations or syntheses. Ernst 
Cassirer has emphasized the functional determination of the concept of atoms in 
Substance and Function where he convincingly argued that the treatment of an atom as 
the “absolute substrate” of properties is only apparent. In fact, the concept of atom 
serves as a mediator for mapping out a network of interdependent relations between 
objects53. 
 Bachelard also emphasized chemists’ concern with relations rather than with 
substrates. Since relations imply at least two terms, chemistry necessarily presupposes 
various kinds of beings. The two features that Bachelard selected to define the 
rationalism of modern chemistry, which he dubbed “non-lavoisieran”, were that it was 
plural and relational. For him, Mendeleev’s system epitomized the shift from realism to 
rationalism, because “law prevailed over matter of fact”54.   
 The focus on relations allows chemists to choose the unit of matter that best suits 
their views. For instance, in Pauling’s valence bond theory, atoms are the combining 
units, and their interaction results in the formation of molecules. By contrast, in 
Mulliken’s molecular orbital approach, the atom is no longer the relevant concept for 
understanding chemical bonds. Molecules are taken as the basic building blocks, formed 
by feeding electrons into molecular orbitals55.  
 After quantum chemistry had drawn physics and chemistry into cooperation, 
chemists continued to debate about the ontological status of relations themselves. In this 
context, we can cite the debate that took place between G. W. Wheland and Pauling 
about double bonds and resonance.56 Thus, time and again, chemists set themselves 
apart by rejecting the physical meaning of the concepts they are using. They champion 
artificiality or “facticity” not only in their experimental practice but also in their 
intellectual practice. If today’s chemists are no longer noncommittal, it is mainly 




because they assemble atoms and molecules like Lego blocks. They believe in orbitals 
as long as they can explain things with them and design reactions. According to 
Hoffmann “The reifying power of synthesis, when you do it with your hands, time and 




The chemists’ “things” are implicitly described in terms of structures, properties 
and functions. Molecular structures are above all conditions for the emergence of 
properties, which themselves are viewed as dispositions for desired performances. 
While chemists do not care for matter, they are by contrast always searching for 
materials, i.e. substances useful for something. Thus, in the eighteenth century, 
Hermann Boerhaave and Guillaume-François Rouelle redefined the four elements in 
terms of agents, conceiving them as both the constituent units of compounds, 
responsible for the conservation and transport of individual properties through chemical 
change, and instruments of chemical reactions. Rouelle introduced his four-element 
theory under the heading “Instruments” that included “natural instruments” - fire, air, 
water and earth -, and two artificial instruments - menstrua and vessels. The ancient 
radical distinction between nature and human artifacts was thereby being blurred in 
favor of an instrumental view of matter as an active operational process. Material 
principles were always at work, circulating from mixt to mixt, whether in laboratory 
vessels or in the depths of the earth or the heights of the heavens. Subsequently, 
following the rise of the compositional paradigm after the reform of chemical language, 
and later the structural paradigm linked with the emergence of organic chemistry, 
chemical names and formulas have been mainly used as “paper tools” for predicting 
operations and substitutions.58. They display the possible uses of compounds through 
their structure. This action-oriented language inspired Bachelard’s description of 
structural formulas as “rational substitutes”, providing a clear account of the 
possibilities for experimentation59. This is why nineteenth-century chemists could reject 
all ontological commitment concerning atoms and molecules, while using them like 
plumbers use pipes, valves, and joints. Even today chemists refuse to endow the atomic 
theory with the power of representing the world, as long as they are concerned with 





powers for intervening in the world. Atoms and molecules are just potential actors in 
the drama of chemical transformation.  
 Ian Hacking’s reflections on the way the physicists use electrons in electron 
microscopy is similar to the way chemists view the constituents of matter60. Electrons 
are less explanatory notions than instruments for acting or creating phenomena. 
Hacking’s distinction between “realism about theories” and “realism about entities” can 
thus be applied to chemistry. To be sure, chemists are realists; they believe in the reality 
of entities, which allow them to operate on the outside world or to be affected by it. 
“Operational realism” would thus be the right phrase to characterize the 
chemists’ philosophy. The material world is a theater for operations; the entities 
underlying observable macroscopic phenomena are above all agents.  
 In this respect, the three categories of structures, properties, and functions are 
not the most appropriate for the philosophy of chemistry. Aristotle provides better 
resources by the addition of his notion of potential, which remains appropriate for 
characterizing the modality of constituent elements in combinations61; The dual nature 
of chemistry – science and technology – requires the whole panoply of subtler 
distinctions found in Aristotle’s treatise on Categories, 862. Properties belong to the 
category of quality, but there are many varieties of qualities. States (for instance, hard or 
soft) differ from dispositions. The former are stable and durable “possessed” qualities, 
whereas the latter are ephemeral and easily altered. Both possessions and dispositions 
being acquired in specific circumstances differ from natural capacities embedded in the 
subject. They all differ from “affections” (bitterness, sweetness), which simply refer to 
sensory properties. The chemists’ art of synthesis takes advantage of the whole 
spectrum of capacities in order to put molecules to work, to make the molecules do 
what chemists cannot do with their own hands. 
 In 2003, Susan Linquist, a biologist from MIT’s Whitehead Institute, announced 
at a conference that: “about 10,000 years ago, [humans] began to domesticate plant and 
animals. Now it’s time to domesticate molecules”63. But domesticating molecules is 
what chemists have been doing for centuries. At the cost of repeated experimental trial 
and error, they have managed to tame an incredible number of molecules, to get 
sufficient control over their reactions to be able to use them as agents for performing 
specific tasks. Nevertheless, this domesticated stuff has never worked in the same way 




as man-made tools or machines. Substances operate according to their own nature, even 
when they are chemical “creatures”. Through a number of more or less spectacular 
chance events and deplorable accidents, chemists have learned that they are still at the 
mercy of unexpected outcomes and that reactants do not always behave in a foreseeable 
way.  
 In addition, chemists usually work with huge populations of molecules in their 
vessels. Unlike nanoscientists, who are trying to domesticate molecules one at a time, 
chemists have no control over individual molecules, although they may know a good 
deal about the species of molecules in question, especially when they have created the 
substance themselves. Nevertheless, the shift in scale of the operations has radically 
changed the relationship between men and materials. The slogan of the nano-initiative, 
“shaping the world atom by atom” expresses the ideal of control and full command that 
lies behind nanotechnology. Individual molecules are supposed to be reliable entities, 
responding predictably to precise signals. So deep is the contrast between this culture of 
precision and the more crude tradition of chemists, that for Eric K Drexler, a champion 
of nanotechnology, chemical synthesis is an inexplicable enterprise, which he compares 
to trying to assemble a car by putting all the necessary parts in a large box and shaking 
them up together.64  Nevertheless, such miraculous processes constitute the everyday 
functioning of the world’s chemical factories. The ‘cars’ that the chemists have 
managed to assemble by such ham-fisted methods are new things, with the constituent 
parts no longer accessible or even visible. When deploying their art, that of making 
molecules work for them, chemists are not like Plato’s demiurge, who builds up a world 
by imposing his own rules and rationality on passive matter. Rather, they are like a 
ship’s pilot at sea, who, constrained by the force of the ocean and atmosphere, is 
obliged to channel or guide the forces and processes given by nature, and ultimately 
exhibits the powers inherent in nature in the outcome.   
 In guise of a conclusion, I want to offer a few reflexive remarks on the functions 
of history in this philosophical essay on chemistry. In his paper on “The relations 
between the history and the philosophy of science”, Kuhn argued that bringing them 
together could be subversive, because philosophy and history were two distinct mental 
sets like the rabbit and duck in the famous Gestalt ‘duck-rabbit’ figure65. Although this 
mutual exclusion seems quite alien to French scholars trained in a tradition that 





promotes the conviction that: “there is no epistemology that is not historical”66, the 
functions of history in this essay have to be clarified. History is not a source of 
examples that serve to illustrate and confirm philosophical claims about the “essence of 
chemistry”. There is no such thing as an immutable essence of chemistry that would fit 
this kind of strong philosophical program anyway. Instead, history is used here as a 
source of problems. The historical materials are not meant to allow us to reconstruct the 
past, rather they are an indispensable detour for grasping the problems at stake and the 
philosophical views shaped by chemists themselves in their investigative and productive 
practices.67 For chemistry is a historical process. The journey into chemistry proposed 
in this essay should be thought of like a trip on a rocket ship that is continuously in 
motion, but changes direction in response to its environment and other circumstances, 
although overall retaining a more or less direct trajectory. The purpose was to identify 
the kind of problems and projects that have guided generations of chemists in defining 
this trajectory over time, thereby (unconsciously) reconfiguring the identity of their 
science. 
 Centuries of chemical practices oriented towards cognition and action have 
generated a set of specific obligations, which can be characterized as both 
epistemological and ethical rules. Caution, utility, and efficiency have been as highly 
valued as the quest for truth in the sense of adaequatio rei et intellectu. The chemical 
sciences are not aimed at unveiling the underlying reality beneath the surface. Instead, 
they deal with a jungle of molecules and strive to take advantage of their dispositions. 
Chemists are put under an obligation by these substances, by their structures, properties 
and capacities, meaning that respect, as much as responsibility, should be at the base of 
a chemist’s ethics.  
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